



Tajamul Rafi¹ , Usha Shrivastav²
and Nasreena Akhtar³

¹Contractual lecturer GDC Handwara J&K.

²Principal Govt. Madav Science college
Vikram University Ujjain.

³Research Scholar Phd RDVV Jabalpur.

Abstract:-

India entered the nuclear club with a bang in may 1974. Prior to this there had been considerable debate in the country on whether India should go nuclear and whether she could afford to do so. Now that India is set on the nuclear path, much of the debate is theoretical Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has of course stated that India does not intend to make nuclear weapons of destruction. But nuclear technology and nuclear explosions, whether for peaceful or destructive purposes cost of the same. If the question whether India can effort it at all is relevant now, it is so only to the extent that we are discussing the pace of development of nuclear technology. The more significant question especially since India still claims that its nuclear programme is strictly for peaceful purpose is: Is it in India's security interest to renounce the use of nuclear technology for building nuclear weapons. What posture we adopt towards a nuclear weapons. Programme will of course depend on our threat perception. The history of India's nuclear technological development begins directly after independence with Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru pressed hard for the development of civilian nuclear facilities in the name of scientific progress and domestic energy production. This was mainly driven by his desire to develop a Commission in 1947 to develop these civilian technologies by the 1960's India had fuel and reprocessing facilities that resulted in weapons- ready plutonium. But all official considerations of nuclear energy research was still focused on civilian technologies. Any talk of nuclear weapons technology did not begin until Indira Gandhi's premiership in the 1970's the research and debates leading to India are peaceful. Nuclear explosion (PNE) did not begin until 1972, shortly after India's third war with Pakistan, even then public discourse on nuclear weapons was minimal.

Keywords:

nuclear club, perception, technological development, agreements, commitments.

INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL AND SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION.

INTRODUCTION :-

The United States- India civil nuclear deal has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the south Asian regional security order by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The Indo-US nuclear deal, which was born out of India's growing energy needs and the United States' renewed strategic interest in the larger Asian region, the South Asian region is passing through an unprecedented strategic transformation following the signing of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The fundamental problems of regional stability and security are being spontaneously transformed by a powerful combination of circumstances in the aftermath of the deal; some believe that if other alternatives are not explored. These are a risk that South Asia will experience dangerous and costly build-up of nuclear arsenals. Which would directly invite the risk of nuclear terrorism? Other has hailed the deal as the equivalent of President Richard Nixon's opening to China in 1972. As part of America's new grand strategy the US wants to incorporate a democratic multi-ethnic and rising India into its strategic fold to shape the emerging international system and also to make the Asian power balance in its favour. The Doctrine also aims at using India's growing influence to counter the Iranian nuclear threat and the Chinese influence in the larger Asian region. (1)

BACKGROUND OF NUCLEAR DEAL AND SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY:

So far as the background of Indo-US nuclear Deal is concerned. On July 18, 2005 US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a bold agreement to restore US nuclear cooperation with India. For the United States, the civil nuclear Cooperation initiative (CNCI) was designed to allow US exports of civilian nuclear technology to India while India in essence pledged to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The CNCI was preceded by an agreement on 28 June 2005 between the two countries' defense Ministers, which stipulated inter alia that India and the US would expand (their) collaboration relating to missile defense. The two agreements are steps in the development of a strategic partnership between India and the US that was formally initiated in 2005 in a process called the next step in strategic partnership (NSSP). (2)

In fact the nuclear deal was part of ambitious US and Indian strategic partnership which launched after the cold war. This new global partnership includes strategic, economic and energy dialogues. One component of the energy dialogue would allow the US to transfer nuclear technology to India as the latter takes a number of non-proliferation steps including measures to safeguard its civilian nuclear infrastructure. The civilian nuclear elements of the new partnership require that the US keep two balls in the air at the same time. Although the US wants to expand its bilateral relationship with India it also wants to maintain its strong non-proliferation policy. Neither should come at the expense of the other. In the eyes of many non-proliferation specialists this new relationship rewards India for its recalcitrance regarding the NPT it undercuts countries that accepted nuclear constraints; and it compromises longstanding US non-proliferation policy and the global non-proliferation regime. The Indian nuclear establishment was very eager to get out of the nuclear denial regime sponsored by the nuclear haves. India is seeking to modernize its aging nuclear power plants with the hope of addressing its growing energy needs. India also hopes that the agreement will allow India to acquire nuclear technology and materials from the United States and other suppliers. The nuclear deal reflects an influential view in India that the non-proliferation regime embodied in the NPT is defective according to Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, the regime is ineffective and that the international community should introduce measures that restrict nuclear proliferation more effectively without suppressing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (3)

123 Agreements and Hyde Act:

The most significant and controversial development in the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement was the passage of the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement. The US Congress passed the Hyde Act in December 2006. Which authorized the Bush administration to negotiate a nuclear agreement with India under certain guidelines the Hyde Act, which was passed with strong bi-partisan support in both chambers of Congress essentially establishes a waiver specific to India (contingent on certain presidential determinations) from a long-standing requirement under American non-proliferation law that NPT be subject to full-scope. The broad objectives of the Bush administration were no different as confirmed by various statements of top officials of the US administration two principal US objectives stand out. The first perhaps the more important one, is to ensure that India's foreign policy is "congruent" to that of the US with this deal expected to induce greater political and military support to the achievement of US goals. India's growing economic and political role in the world is seen as a new and significant strategic opportunity to

advance US goals. The second objective relates to non-proliferation, through strengthening and sustaining the implementation of the NPT India remaining outside the NPT poses a “potential challenge to the goals of global non-proliferation”.⁴

IAEA safeguards agreement and NSG (Nuclear supplier group) after several rounds of hectic negotiations beginning in November 2007 the International atomic energy agency finally approved the India specific safeguard agreement on August 11 2008. The IAEA decision was a green signal for India to approach the 45 member nuclear suppliers group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade. The 45 nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world. The US House of Representatives passed the nuclear deal on September 28, 2008 two days later, India and France the first linked a similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have such an agreement with India. On October 1, 2008 the US senate also approved the Civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the United States in a well attended ceremony that underlined the Strategic importance of the Indian nuclear deal to the United States. President George.W.Bush on October 8, 2008 signed into law the US India nuclear cooperation approval and nonproliferation enhancement act. The act known as HR7081 was passed by congress on October 1 and represents the American legislatures formal approval of the US India bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement the 123 agreement concluded in July 2007. (5)

ACHANGING REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH ASIA:

South Asian security is at crossroads the South Asian region is passing through an unprecedented strategic transformation following the signing of the Indo-US civil-Nuclear cooperation agreement. The region is fast getting sucked into the vortex of terrorism. The Afghan war has crossed the Khyber and is stealthily advancing towards the fertile Indo-genetic plains. The fundamental problems of regional stability and security are being spontaneously transformed by a powerful combination of circumstances in the aftermath of the deal (6). The US leads war on terror initiated in the aftermath of September 11 incidents is now centered in South Asia. The association of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan and the 26/11/2008 Mumbai terror attack proved the magnitude of the emerging situation in a conflict ridden, nuclear- armed region. (7) It could force major stake holders to re-evaluate their security interests in the face of emerging Indo-US strategic partnership thus triggering transformation of regional alliance structures where India is seen decisively shifting towards the United states and Pakistan exploring defense and nuclear pact with China. India's insistence on keeping large part of its nuclear facilities outside the inspection regime, insistence on US assurance for perpetual fuel supplies for civilian facilities even if it violates part of the agreement and India's reluctance to declare moratorium on fissile material production clearly sent wrong signals to Pakistan,. This could make other nuclear weapons states in the region uncomfortable. (8)

US And Indian commitments

(1) Indian commitments	US commitments
Separate civilian from military facilities(65:35)	Amend Atomic energy act (sec 123,128,129)
Place civilian under IAEA safeguards	Remove India-specific NPT-plus sanctions (NNPA-1978)
Negotiate India-specific safeguards agreement with IAEA (beyond INFCIRC66 Rev-2)	Get exemption from nuclear suppliers group
Align control list with NSG and MTCR	Restore uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply to Tarapur
Strengthen export control laws and enforcement	Induct India into cutting-edge nuclear energy consortiums CITER and generation iv forum
Additional steps	Additional steps
Agree to "in perpetuity" safeguards for reactors receiving external fuel supply	Incorporate assurances for fuel supply within 123 agreement
Sign & ratify additional protocols of IAEA	Assign India in creating its strategic nuclear fuel reserve
Accept NSG-plus conditions (no transfer of Uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technologies to countries that do not have them)	If disruptions still occur, work with friendly supplier states (France, UK, Russia) to restore fuel supply
Continued moratorium on nuclear testing	Join India in negotiation India specific safeguards

CONCLUSION:

From the above detailed discussion we may conclude here that the ,South Asian security is at a crossroads. The region is passing through an unprecedented strategic transformation following the signing of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The region is fact getting sucked into the vortex of terrorism. The fundamental problems of regional stability and security are being spontaneously transformed by a powerful combination of circumstances in the aftermath of the deal. The driving forces for nuclear modernization remain in place and this will continue to develop in the aftermath of the Indo-US nuclear deal based on balance of power theory and long term behavioral patterns. China will accelerate nuclear and strategic cooperation with Pakistan. US will also work towards forming a balancing coalition with India. South Asia has been a major theater of rivalry during the cold war era but has been relatively immuned of great power rivalry for the last 15years.

REFERENCES

1. International journal of South Asian studies USAS-July. December 2008.
2. Tellis A-J, India as a new global power an action agenda for the united states, 2005
3. T.S. Subramanian-Non-Proliferation and international security - July September 2004.
4. Charles, D. Ferguson, Reshaping the US.S India Nuclear Deal to lesson the Non- Proliferation Losses 2008 Arms central today.
5. Siddarth vacadarajan, Bush signing on 123, the Hindu.com.2008.

6. Shahzad Nadeem, The Regional Implications of the US- India Agreement, Foreign policy Focus, 29 April, 2006.
7. Zagar Iqbal cheema, Nuclear command and control in south Asia, New York, comell University press, pp. 123.
8. Sam Nun, Nuclear Pig in a poke, The wall street journal, Jay 24, 2006.